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THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND 
CIVIL RIGHTS: LESSONS LEARNED 
GOODWIN LIU* 
Among the chief tasks of democratic government, none is more 
basic than securing the equality of all persons before the law. In our 
constitutional tradition, especially since Brown v. Board of 
Education,1 we have often looked to the courts to enforce civil rights 
on behalf of members of historically disadvantaged groups. But our 
nation’s progress on civil rights has not been the work of courts alone. 
Many of the civil rights laws we take for granted are testaments to the 
leadership of the political branches, and no political actor in our 
modern structure of government has greater power to set a robust 
civil rights agenda than the President of the United States. 
In this article, I examine the civil rights record of President 
George W. Bush to distill some lessons for the proper administration 
of justice and for the broader framing of contemporary civil rights 
challenges. My remarks proceed in two parts. In Part I, I discuss the 
enforcement of civil rights laws by the U.S. Department of Justice. The 
record of the Bush Administration reveals a shift away from 
traditional enforcement priorities and, more significantly, a worrisome 
erosion of institutional norms of impartiality, professionalism, and 
nonpartisanship in civil rights enforcement. I propose a few 
recommendations for new safeguards to restore these fundamental 
law enforcement norms. 
In Part II, I discuss events and initiatives outside of the 
Department of Justice that are associated more closely and personally 
with President Bush. I examine three issues in particular: the Bush 
Administration’s handling of the University of Michigan affirmative 
action cases; the President’s signature K–12 education initiative, the 
 
 * Associate Dean and Professor of Law, UC Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful to 
Chris Schroeder for inviting me to give this lecture at Duke Law School as part of a series 
examining lessons learned from the Bush Administration. Nicole Ries provided superb research 
assistance. 
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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No Child Left Behind Act; and the government’s response to 
Hurricane Katrina. The primary lesson is that, although our society 
shares a broad commitment to diversity and inclusion, we have yet to 
develop the political will or the policy frameworks to address the 
social dysfunctions arising from the intersection of race and poverty. 
I.  CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT BY THE  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice is the 
nation’s foremost civil rights enforcement agency. Created in 1957 by 
legislation signed by President Eisenhower, the Division began with a 
specific charge to protect voting rights.2 Over five decades, its 
responsibilities have grown to include enforcement of 
antidiscrimination laws in employment, education, housing, public 
accommodations, and the criminal justice system. Today the Division 
consists of ten sections with over 300 lawyers and a yearly budget of 
$114 million.3 
Throughout our history, the Civil Rights Division has played a 
prominent and venerable role. Its early challenges to voting 
discrimination in the South laid the groundwork for the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965.4 During the 1960s, the Division was instrumental in 
enforcing Brown v. Board of Education in recalcitrant states and 
school districts.5 In the 1970s, the Division’s aggressive enforcement of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 secured employment 
 
 2. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, §§ 111, 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637–38. The 
legislation also created a federal Commission on Civil Rights charged with investigating alleged 
deprivations of voting rights and other violations of the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection. See id. §§ 101–105, 71 Stat. at 634–36. 
 3. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2009 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET SUBMISSION, Exhibits B and I (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2009justification/pdf/fy09-crt.pdf. For a helpful overview of the 
origins, organization, and responsibilities of the Civil Rights Division, see BRIAN K. 
LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE (1997) [hereinafter LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS]. 
 4. See BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE: THE ALABAMA ORIGINS OF THE 
1965 VOTING RIGHTS ACT 148–63 (2007). 
 5. Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 authorized the Attorney General of the United 
States to bring suit in federal court to enforce desegregation in public schools. See Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 407, 78 Stat. 241, 248. Title IX of the Act authorized the 
Attorney General to intervene in cases “of general public importance” involving a denial of 
equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. § 902, 78 Stat. at 266–67. 
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opportunities for qualified women and minorities.6 Through these 
efforts and others, the Civil Rights Division has helped establish a 
legacy of federal leadership in promoting fair opportunity and equal 
citizenship for all Americans. 
During the Bush Administration, enforcement of civil rights laws 
waned in several key areas as the Division shifted its priorities. This 
shift has been amply documented elsewhere,7 so I will not discuss it in 
detail here. Among the key changes, the Civil Rights Division under 
President Bush filed relatively few cases under section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965,8 a law that the Division has traditionally used to 
combat minority vote dilution.9 The Division appeared to displace its 
traditional concern for the voting rights of African-Americans with a 
predominant focus on Hispanic voters through its choice of section 2 
litigation10 and through its enforcement of the language access 
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.11 
 
 6. See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal 
Employment Opportunity Law Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1145–47 (1989) 
(discussing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), EEOC v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 
556 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1977), United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 
1975), and In re Trucking Indus. Employment Practices Litig., 384 F. Supp. 614 (J.P.M.L. 1974), 
among other cases). 
 7. See, e.g., Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights Enforcement 
Within the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, 
and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 139–68 (2007) [hereinafter 
Changing Tides] (testimony and prepared statement of Wade Henderson, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights); THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: 
DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 12–48 
(William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter EROSION OF RIGHTS]; Senator Edward M. 
Kennedy, Restoring the Civil Rights Division, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 217–27 (2008). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 9. The Bush Administration filed fifteen cases under section 2, averaging less than two 
cases per year. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section Litigation: Cases 
Raising Claims Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/ 
litigation/caselist.php#sec2cases (last visited May 15, 2009) [hereinafter Section 2 Cases].  
By contrast, the Civil Rights Division filed thirty-three cases under section 2 during the six and a 
half years of the Reagan Administration following the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights 
Act (over five cases per year); eight cases during the four years of the first Bush Administration 
(two cases per year); and thirty-four cases during the eight years of the Clinton Administration 
(over four cases per year). See Joseph D. Rich et al., The Voting Section, in EROSION OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 32, 41. 
 10. Ten of the fifteen section 2 cases filed during the Bush Administration asserted claims 
on behalf of Hispanic voters, while four asserted claims on behalf of African-Americans.  
See Section 2 Cases, supra note 9. 
 11. The Bush Administration significantly increased the number of suits filed under section 
203 and section 4(f)(4) of the Voting Rights Act, which require covered jurisdictions to provide 
voting materials in the language of each language minority community. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973aa-
1a, 1973b(f)(4) (2006); Rich et al., supra note 9, at 42. Across the nation, there are 370 language 
minority communities covered by section 203: 60% are Hispanic, 33% are American Indian or 
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In the area of employment discrimination, the Bush 
Administration filed fewer complaints under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 than its predecessor and, in particular, fewer Title 
VII complaints on behalf of African-Americans.12 Moreover, the Bush 
Administration sought to narrow the reach of Title VII by filing a 
Supreme Court amicus brief in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Co., arguing that the time window for filing a pay discrimination claim 
is not reset by each discriminatory paycheck and instead expires 180 
days after the first discriminatory act, whether detectable by the 
affected employee or not.13 Although a five-to-four majority of the 
Court adopted this reading of the limitations period,14 the decision 
was swiftly overturned by Congress.15 The Bush Administration also 
sided with the employer in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway 
Co. v. White in arguing that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision covers 
only retaliatory acts that relate to the terms and conditions of 
employment.16 The Supreme Court squarely rejected that view.17 
 
Native Alaskan, and 7% are Asian-American. See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1992, 
Determinations Under section 203, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,871, 48,872–77 (July 26, 2002). But almost 
all of the language access suits filed by the Bush Administration asserted claims on behalf of 
Hispanic voters. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section Litigation: 
Cases Raising Claims Under the Language Minority Provisions of the Voting Rights Act, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/caselist.php#sec203cases (last visited May 15, 2009). 
The Bush Administration filed no voting rights complaints on behalf of American Indians or 
Native Alaskans. 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). The Bush Administration filed sixty-one complaints 
under Title VII, compared to ninety-two complaints filed by the Clinton Administration.  
See Richard S. Ugelow, The Employment Litigation Section, in EROSION OF RIGHTS, supra note 
7, at 26, 29 (reviewing data “show[ing] that the [Bush] administration has reduced Title VII 
enforcement, and this is especially true when it comes to bringing actions on behalf of African 
Americans”); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Employment Litigation Section, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/emp/papers.html (last visited May 18, 2009). 
 13. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 6–8, Ledbetter 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074). 
 14. Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 633–43. In reaching this judgment, the Court rejected the 
contrary view of nine federal courts of appeals and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission. Id. at 654–56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 15. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (amending 
various acts relating to employment “to clarify that a discriminatory compensation decision or 
other practice that is unlawful under such Acts occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant 
to the discriminatory compensation decision or other practice”). The Ledbetter decision was a 
prominent Democratic campaign issue in the 2008 election. See, e.g., Women’s Pay Disparity a 
Growing Campaign Issue, NPR MORNING EDITION, Sept. 8, 2008, available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=94377272. 
 16. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9–20, 
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (No. 05-259). The brief is styled 
as “Supporting Respondent” because it urges the Court to affirm the judgment below in favor 
of the respondent. Most of the brief, however, is devoted to arguing for a narrow view of  
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision. 
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These actions and others marked a shift in civil rights enforcement 
priorities. But it is important to acknowledge that the Bush 
Administration, like any presidential administration, is entitled to set 
priorities and shape enforcement in accordance with its policy goals. 
Even if “the ‘take Care’ clause is a duty, not a license . . . impos[ing] an 
obligation on the President to enforce duly enacted laws,” the 
executive branch “has the power to set enforcement priorities and to 
allocate resources to those problems that, in the judgment of the 
executive, seem most severe.”18 The Bush Administration did not 
enforce employment or voting rights as aggressively as its 
predecessor, but it devoted significant resources to other issues. For 
example, the Criminal Section of the Civil Rights Division vigorously 
enforced the prohibition on human trafficking—in particular, sex 
trafficking—in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act passed in 2000.19 
In addition, the Department of Justice pursued a visible campaign to 
protect religious liberty and to combat religious discrimination in 
employment, education, housing, and public accommodations.20 
Further, President Bush supported and signed the ADA Amendments 
Act of 2008, which overruled several Supreme Court decisions in 
order to broaden the protective reach of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.21 
However, executive discretion in interpreting and enforcing the 
law, while broad, is conditioned to a large extent upon technical 
competence and political accountability. In our constitutional system, 
the delegation of law enforcement discretion is not an authorization 
 
 17. See Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 63 (“An employer can effectively retaliate against 
an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm 
outside the workplace.”) (emphasis in original). The Court explained that “the anti-retaliation 
provision’s objective would not be achieved” unless the provision is read to cover “the many 
forms that effective retaliation can take.” Id. at 63–64 (emphasis in original). 
 18. Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 653, 670 (1985). 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2006). The Bush administration steadily increased the budget of the 
Criminal Section, with most of the new resources devoted to prosecuting sex trafficking while 
traditional enforcement areas, such as labor trafficking, hate crimes, and police misconduct, saw 
little change. See Seth Rosenthal, The Criminal Section, in EROSION OF RIGHTS,  
supra note 7, at 18, 20–23. 
 20. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AFFECTING 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: FISCAL YEARS 2001–2006 (2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ 
religdisc/ff_report.htm. 
 21. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553. The statute 
overruled the narrow interpretations of the statutory definition of “disability” in Toyota Motor 
Manufacturing, Kentucky Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002), and in Sutton v. United Airlines, 
527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases. 
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to act on political whim. It instead assumes a degree of 
evenhandedness rooted in professional expertise and institutional 
tradition, as well as the operation of checks and balances that subject 
enforcement priorities to public scrutiny and that maintain the rule of 
law. Nowhere are these safeguards more important than in the 
Department of Justice and especially in the Civil Rights Division. By 
this measure, there is cause for concern, for the Bush Administration 
did not merely shift enforcement priorities. It did so within a highly 
politicized and unaccountable decisional structure. 
A. Politicization of Civil Rights Enforcement 
Improper politicization of civil rights enforcement occurred in the 
enforcement area where politics ought to matter least: voting. Until 
2006, when the Republican Party lost control of Congress, the Civil 
Rights Division saw a systemic deterioration of relations between 
political leaders and career professionals, with the most severe 
dysfunctions occurring in the Voting Section.22 Failure to respect the 
professional judgment of career employees led the Division, in several 
instances, to take positions antithetical to the interests of minority 
groups where the applicable law or available evidence pointed to a 
different conclusion. 
Perhaps the most troubling incidents occurred in the 
Department’s handling of preclearance submissions under section 5 
of the Voting Rights Act. Under section 5, covered state and local 
jurisdictions (so designated because of their past discriminatory 
practices) must obtain federal preclearance before implementing any 
change in voting procedures.23 The Department of Justice reviews 
voting changes to ensure that they do not have either a discriminatory 
purpose or a discriminatory effect.24 As an internal check on partisan 
influence, the Department has traditionally assigned responsibility for 
 
 22. Changing Tides, supra note 7, at 114–21 (testimony of Joseph D. Rich). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). Covered jurisdictions may obtain preclearance either from 
the Department of Justice or through a declaratory judgment action in federal district court. 
Historically, the declaratory judgment action has been rarely used. See Rich et al.,  
supra note 9, at 34 (“[S]ince 1965, Section 5 jurisdictions have submitted over 440,000 voting 
changes to the Department of Justice but have filed only sixty-eight preclearance lawsuits 
involving perhaps several hundred voting changes.”). Congress reauthorized section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act in 2006, and the Supreme Court is now deciding whether the current 
designations of covered jurisdictions exceed Congress’ enforcement powers under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, No. 
08-322 (U.S. argued Apr. 29, 2009). 
 24. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52 (2008). 
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investigating preclearance submissions and issuing recommendations 
to the career staff of the Voting Section. The staff recommendation is 
presented to the Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in a 
memorandum analyzing the facts and relevant law. Historically, 
through Republican and Democratic administrations, the political 
leadership has rarely disagreed with staff recommendations, and when 
disagreement has occurred, political leaders have explained in writing 
their reasons for rejecting staff recommendations.25 In recent years, 
this process has been undermined. 
In December of 2001, the Department of Justice received a 
preclearance submission for a new congressional redistricting plan 
ordered by a Mississippi state court. While the submission was 
pending, the Republican Party persuaded a federal court to order an 
alternative plan if the state court plan was not precleared by the end 
of the official sixty-day window for Department of Justice review.26 
After reviewing the submission, the career staff unanimously agreed 
that the state court plan complied with section 5 and recommended 
that it be precleared. However, the political staff rejected the 
recommendation and instead extended the review period to seek 
more information from the state on whether the fact that a state 
court, not a state legislature, had ordered the plan would affect 
preclearance, despite no legal basis to think it would. When the  
sixty-day window passed with no preclearance decision, the federal 
court put in place the Republican-favored plan.27 
Partisan influence also appeared to affect the Department’s 
handling of the Texas mid-decade congressional redistricting plan 
conceived by House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.28 In a detailed 
seventy-three page memorandum analyzing the impact of the plan on 
minority voting strength, a seven-member team of nonpartisan career 
staff, along with the section chief, unanimously determined that the 
plan would have retrogressive effect and recommended against 
preclearance.29 But the Department, without explanation, precleared 
 
 25. Rich et al., supra note 9, at 38. 
 26. See Smith v. Clark, 189 F. Supp. 2d 529 (S.D. Miss. 2002); 28 C.F.R. § 51.9 (2008);  
see also id. § 51.37 (authorizing the Attorney General to request additional information from 
the submitting jurisdiction and to reset the sixty-day review period). 
 27. Rich et al., supra note 9, at 36–37; Kennedy, supra note 7, at 219 & n.34. 
 28. Dan Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal: Voting Rights Finding on Map 
Pushed by DeLay Was Overruled, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at A1. 
 29. Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum (Dec. 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/texasDOJmemo.pdf. 
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the plan in December of 2003, and the Texas Republican delegation 
gained five seats in Congress in 2004.30 Two years later, the Supreme 
Court held that the plan violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act by 
improperly diluting Latino voting strength.31 
Further, in August of 2005, the Department precleared a Georgia 
law requiring government-issued photo identification in order to vote 
at the polls, just one day after a fifty-one-page staff memorandum had 
recommended against preclearance.32 The reviewing staff, by a  
four-to-one vote, determined that “blacks will [sic] disparately 
impacted compared to whites” based on “the totality of the evidence” 
and that the state failed to show non-retrogression because it never 
“conducted any analysis or presented any data regarding . . . racial 
disparities in access to various forms of photo identification.”33 After 
the law went into effect, a federal court enjoined its enforcement on 
constitutional grounds, finding that it “imposes ‘severe’ restrictions on 
the right to vote,” “constitutes a poll tax,” and “is most likely to 
prevent Georgia’s elderly, poor, and African-American voters from 
voting.”34 
The integrity of the preclearance process has also been damaged 
in other ways. At some point before the Georgia preclearance 
 
 30. See Janet Hook, Ambitious Goals Will Test GOP’s New Muscle, L.A. TIMES,  
Nov. 23, 2004, at A1 (reporting that “Republicans gained five seats in Texas, thanks to a bold 
redistricting plan championed by DeLay”). 
 31. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 427–42 (2006). Justice 
Stevens took the unusual step of observing that “[n]otwithstanding the unanimous opinion of 
the staff attorneys in the Voting Section of the Justice Department that [the plan] was 
retrogressive and that the Attorney General should have interposed an objection, the Attorney 
General elected to preclear the map, thus allowing it to take effect.” Id. at 480 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Court agreed with the staff memorandum that, 
with respect to Latino voters, the plan “undermined the progress of a racial group that has been 
subject to significant voting-related discrimination and that was becoming increasingly 
politically active and cohesive.” Id. at 439 (majority opinion). But the Court did not find that the 
plan diluted black voting strength in violation of section 2, even though the staff memorandum 
had found retrogression in black voting strength in violation of section 5. See id. at 443–47;  
cf. id. at 446 (noting differences between section 2 and section 5 standards). 
 32. Dan Eggen, Criticism of Voting Law Was Overruled: Justice Dept. Backed Georgia 
Measure Despite Fears of Discrimination, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2005, at A1. 
 33. Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum at 31 (Aug. 25, 2005), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/16/AR2005111602504.html. 
 34. Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1365–66, 1370  
(N.D. Ga. 2005). Although the Supreme Court upheld Indiana’s voter identification law in 
Crawford v. Marian County Election Board, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008), the Indiana plaintiffs did not 
make the evidentiary showing of discriminatory disenfranchisement that the Georgia plaintiffs 
had made. See Ind. Democratic Party v. Rotika, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 831–32 (S.D. Ind. 2006), 
aff’d, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007),  
aff’d, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). 
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decision, the political leadership barred career staff from making 
recommendations on section 5 submissions, limiting the staff role to 
investigation and analysis.35 Moreover, the four staff members who 
counseled against preclearance of the Georgia law were reprimanded 
while the one dissenting staff member received a bonus for his work 
in the case.36 In addition, staff positions within the Voting Section were 
cut through repeated failures to fill vacated posts during a period of 
discontent and high turnover, making it difficult for the Department 
of Justice to carefully review all section 5 submissions.37 
Partisan considerations appear to have influenced other voting 
rights matters. Despite filing few amicus briefs throughout the Bush 
Administration, the Civil Rights Division opted to file three such 
briefs on the eve of the 2004 election in the battleground states of 
Florida, Michigan, and Ohio.38 Each brief argued that there is no 
private right of action to enforce the counting of provisional ballots 
under the Help America Vote Act (HAVA).39 In all three cases, the 
courts rejected the government’s position.40 Moreover, in enforcing 
the National Voter Registration Act, the Department devoted far 
more effort to pushing states and local jurisdictions to remove 
ineligible voters from the rolls—despite no evidence of fraud—than 
to protecting the right of eligible voters to have access to registration 
opportunities.41 
These incidents were part of a broader pattern of undue and, in 
some cases, unlawful political influence in civil rights matters and 
 
 35. Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2005, 
at A3. 
 36. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 220. 
 37. Changing Tides, supra note 7, at 118 (testimony of Joseph D. Rich). 
 38. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 225–26. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Sandusky County Democratic Party v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 565, 572 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that “[t]he rights-creating language of HAVA section 302(a)(2) is unambiguous” and 
enforceable under § 1983); Fla. Democratic Party v. Hood, 342 F. Supp. 2d 1073, 1078  
(N.D. Fla. 2004) (HAVA “clearly creates a federal right enforceable under § 1983.”); County 
Democratic Party v. Land, 347 F. Supp. 2d 404, 426 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (holding that HAVA 
contains “unmistakable rights-focused language” that “establish[es] a private right of action”). 
 41. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Cases Raising Claims Under the 
National Voter Registration Act, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/recent_nvra.html 
(last visited May 20, 2009); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 28–30, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008)  
(Nos. 07-21 & 07-25) (supporting the constitutionality of Indiana’s voter identification law on 
the ground that “the temptation [to engage in voter fraud] is obvious and the consequences of 
undeterred and undetected violations are enormous,” despite citing no evidence of voter fraud 
in Indiana). 
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beyond. Within the Civil Rights Division, the political leadership 
reassigned many career employees who were seen as insufficiently 
loyal to the Bush Administration’s political views.42 Regular channels 
of communication between political appointees and career attorneys 
on policy issues were narrowed or eliminated.43 Political leaders also 
took direct control of hiring decisions, abandoning longstanding 
hiring practices that relied principally on the professional, 
nonpartisan judgment of career staff.44 The shift resulted in 
substantially increased hiring of attorneys with strong conservative 
credentials but little or no background in civil rights enforcement.45 
After an extensive investigation, the Department of Justice’s 
Inspector General concluded that political appointees in charge of 
hiring for the Honors Program and the Summer Law Intern Program 
“took political or ideological affiliations into account in [screening] 
candidates in violation of Department policy and federal law.”46 In 
two additional reports, the Inspector General found that several 
political appointees violated federal law and Department policy by 
considering political or ideological affiliations in screening candidates 
for Assistant U.S. Attorney, immigration judge, and career positions in 
the Civil Rights Division.47 
 
 42. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED 
HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 35–45 
(2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf [hereinafter OIG CIVIL 
RIGHTS DIVISION REPORT]. 
 43. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 213–15. 
 44. See Charlie Savage, Civil Rights Hiring Shifted in Bush Era: Conservative Leanings 
Stressed, BOSTON GLOBE, July 23, 2006, at A1. Commenting on the traditional hiring process in 
which career staff played a central role, Charles Cooper, a former deputy assistant attorney 
general for civil rights in the Reagan administration, said: “There was obviously oversight from 
the front office, but I don’t remember a time when an individual went through that process and 
was not accepted. I just don’t think there was any quarrel with the quality of individuals who 
were being hired. And we certainly weren’t placing any kind of political litmus test on . . . the 
individuals who were ultimately determined to be best qualified.” Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 45. Id. 
 46. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED 
HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN 
PROGRAM 99 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0806/final.pdf [hereinafter 
OIG HONORS PROGRAM REPORT]. 
 47. OIG CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION REPORT, supra note 42, at 64; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND 
OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 135–38 (2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter OIG GOODLING REPORT]. 
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B. Additional Safeguards Against Improper Politicization 
The lesson learned from recent experience is that existing 
safeguards are not sufficient to protect against the politicization of 
civil rights enforcement. Many of those safeguards take the form of 
agency practices and traditions established over the decades to strike 
an appropriate balance between evenhanded law enforcement and 
the legitimate prerogative of each administration to set priorities. 
Hopefully new political leaders will restore and adhere to the 
traditional safeguards. The problem, however, is that informal 
safeguards do not provide an adequate check when political leaders 
are prepared to disregard them. The abuses of the Bush 
Administration suggest that additional mechanisms are needed to 
ensure the fair administration of civil rights laws. 
1. Congressional oversight 
As a starting point, what role might Congress play? In theory, 
Congress is the President’s political rival and the ultimate overseer of 
policy development and implementation. Congressional oversight is 
supposed to promote transparency in executive action and to broadly 
ensure faithful execution of the laws. In practice, however, 
competition between political parties often displaces competition 
between the political branches as the primary factor regulating 
separation of powers between Congress and the President. As Daryl 
Levinson and Richard Pildes have observed, “[t]he practical 
distinction between party-divided and party-unified government 
rivals in significance, and often dominates, the constitutional 
distinction between the branches in predicting and explaining 
interbranch political dynamics.”48 
It is unsurprising, then, that Congress exercised virtually no 
meaningful oversight of the Civil Rights Division between the 
midterm election of 2002 and the midterm election of 2006, a period 
in which Republicans controlled both houses of Congress. Neither the 
House nor the Senate convened an oversight hearing by a full 
committee to examine the activities of the Civil Rights Division 
during the four years of one-party rule,49 the period in which voting 
 
 48. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers,  
119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2315 (2006). 
 49. The only oversight hearing I could find between 2002 and 2006 was a brief 
subcommittee hearing in 2004. See Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. 
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rights enforcement became politicized. After control of Congress 
changed hands in 2006, legislative oversight became more vigorous.50 
The erosion of checks and balances during one-party rule has 
prompted proposals to empower the minority party in Congress, for 
example, by allowing the minority to conduct oversight hearings or by 
requiring a supermajority vote to authorize certain executive actions.51 
Such proposals raise concerns about legislative gridlock; some would 
point to the increasing use or threat of the filibuster as an example.52 
Nevertheless, the minority party has incentives to use any new 
checking mechanisms judiciously. Aggressive oversight that is 
perceived as an unreasonable dilatory tactic or a usurpation of 
executive discretion not only exposes the minority to loss of public 
support but also licenses the majority party in Congress to retaliate 
with procedural tools for limiting minority influence and 
participation. 
Apart from possible gridlock, the more serious hurdle to 
empowering the minority during one-party rule is practical. Under 
what circumstances would the ruling majority agree to enact such 
minority-empowering measures? In periods of divided government, it 
is unlikely that the legislative majority would opt to strengthen the 
President’s party in Congress. And as we enter another period of  
one-party rule, the thought of newly elected Democrats enacting 
safeguards for the benefit of the Republican minority seems fanciful, 
 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004). A similar lack of oversight occurred in many areas 
beyond civil rights. See U.S. H. OF REPS. COMM. ON GOVERNMENT REFORM—MINORITY 
STAFF, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, CONG. OVERSIGHT OF THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2006); Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, Note, The NSA Domestic 
Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party 
Rule, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149 (2006); Susan Milligan, Congress Reduces Its Oversight 
Role: Since Clinton, a Change in Focus, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2005, at A1. 
 50. E.g., Oversight Hearing on Voter Suppression Before the H. Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110th Cong. (2008); Civil Rights Division 
Oversight: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007); Oversight Hearing 
on the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice Before the H. 
Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110th Cong. (2007);  
Changing Tides, supra note 7. 
 51. See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2342 (2006); Levinson & Pildes, supra note 
48, at 2370–72, 2375; cf. Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules: Forcing Accountability upon 
Majorities, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 74, 75 (2005) (arguing that “submajority rules” serve “to enable a 
minority to force public accountability and transparency upon the majority, rendering 
decisionmaking more principled and more deliberative”). 
 52. David Herszenhorn, How the Filibuster Became the Rule, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2007, 
Week in Review, at 5. 
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just as it is naïve to think the Republican majority ever contemplated 
empowering the Democratic minority between 2002 and 2006. It is 
unclear how new minority protections could gain traction precisely 
because our political system is so polarized today.53 
Moreover, even if Congress were to authorize minority oversight 
or to establish, as the Citizens’ Commission on Civil Rights has 
proposed, a new bipartisan committee of the House and Senate to 
monitor civil rights,54 there remains a more basic question concerning 
the efficacy of congressional oversight. As Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule have explained, Congress faces a number of institutional 
obstacles to effective monitoring of executive action: Congress lacks 
information and expertise that the executive branch has; Congress 
faces collective action problems that weaken the impetus to protect 
legislative prerogatives; the monitoring capacities of congressional 
committees are dwarfed by the sheer scale of executive branch 
operations; and Congress often suffers a credibility gap vis-à-vis the 
President in public opinion.55 These challenges should induce a sober 
assessment of what we can expect from the oversight mechanism. 
That is not to say that vigilant oversight of the Civil Rights Division 
from 2002 to 2006 would have made no difference. It is to say that 
reliably curbing or preventing abuses of executive discretion will 
probably require not only interbranch but also intrabranch solutions. 
2. Internal procedures to improve transparency and accountability 
The recent politicization of civil rights enforcement suggests that 
stronger checks are needed within the Department of Justice to 
 
 53. A statute occasionally cited as a minority protection is 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (2007), which 
authorizes seven members of the House Committee on Governmental Operations or five 
members of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs to request from “[a]n Executive 
agency” any information “relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.”  
See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 887 
(2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 2954 as authorization for oversight by a “partisan minority”). That 
provision, however, was adopted in 1928 to preserve Congress’ power to request information as 
part of a housekeeping statute discontinuing certain reports that executive agencies had 
previously been required to submit to Congress. See H.R. REP. NO. 70-1757, at 6 (1928);  
S. REP. NO. 70-1320, at 4 (1928); see also Louis Fisher, Congressional Access to Information: 
Using Legislative Will and Leverage, 52 DUKE L.J. 323, 362–63 (2002) (discussing history of the 
statute). Section 2954 had nothing to do with protecting partisan minorities, as evidenced by the 
fact that the original Senate committee affected by the provision (i.e., the Senate Committee on 
Expenditures, see Act of May 29, 1928, ch. 901, § 2, 45 Stat. 996) had only seven members. See 
69 CONG. REC. 481 (1927) (listing members of Senate standing committees, including the Senate 
Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments). 
 54. EROSION OF RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 8–9. 
 55. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 53, at 884–90. 
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proceduralize and professionalize the administration of law. There is a 
risk, however, that moving the pendulum too far in this direction will 
create undue obstacles to presidential leadership and innovation. 
Many important changes will need to come from the appointment of 
new leaders with unimpeachable integrity and from the tone and 
norms they establish. With that in mind, let me discuss three 
strategies: first, better insulating the career staff from political caprice; 
second, enhancing transparency in agency decisionmaking; and third, 
pushing important decisions up the agency hierarchy in order to 
foster accountability. None of these measures would directly limit the 
substantive policy goals that a given administration may wish to 
pursue, but they would improve transparency and accountability in 
the pursuit of those goals. 
The importance of career staff in the Department of Justice, as in 
other agencies, lies in the expertise, nonpartisanship, and long-term 
perspective they bring to executing the law. Friction between career 
staff and political appointees is not surprising given the different time 
horizons that shape their approach to law enforcement, the room for 
reasonable disagreement in interpreting the law, and “the lack of a 
concrete client.”56 Such friction is, by design, an internal check that 
leavens the Department’s pursuit of administration policy with 
attention to institutional history and core law enforcement duties. This 
internal check cannot function properly unless career staff are hired 
on the basis of merit, not politics, and, once hired, have the practical 
ability to make professional judgments without fear of reprisal. 
The politicization of personnel decisions during the Bush 
Administration occurred not because of substantive gaps in existing 
law or Department policy, but because political leaders appear to 
have violated existing prohibitions. Many recommendations for 
corrective action now being discussed focus on vigorous and accurate 
communication of personnel rules to Department employees, job 
candidates, and the general public, as well as proper training for all 
supervisors with authority to make personnel decisions.57 Although 
these steps are needed, what is most troubling about the recent period 
is that improper acts of politicization continued for many years, with 
the first official accounting of those acts issued in 2008 by the 
 
 56. LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 3, at 156. 
 57. OIG CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION REPORT, supra note 42, at 65; OIG GOODLING REPORT, 
supra note 47, at 139; OIG HONORS PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 101–02;  
Kennedy, supra note 7, at 228. 
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Inspector General. Given the individual toll on the reputations and 
livelihoods of career employees as well as the institutional toll on the 
Department’s efficacy and credibility, the failure to correct improper 
personnel decisions in real time raises serious questions about the 
adequacy of existing mechanisms for complaints, investigations, and 
remedies.58 This concern calls for a careful review of the overlapping 
jurisdictions of the Department’s Inspector General and Office of 
Professional Responsibility, the United States Office of Special 
Counsel,59 and the Merit Systems Protection Board. Such a review, 
commissioned either by Congress or by the Attorney General, should 
aim to clarify the procedure for reporting and timely investigating 
allegations of misconduct going forward. 
Equally important is the need for genuine accountability when 
misconduct has occurred. Under current law, an employee who has 
committed a prohibited personnel practice is subject to discharge, 
demotion, suspension, reprimand, a five-year debarment from federal 
employment, and a civil fine of $1,000.60 But these disciplinary options 
do not apply to Senate-confirmed presidential appointees.61 Further, 
the recent Inspector General reports on politicized hiring observed 
that political appointees who have violated the law but who have 
voluntarily resigned from the Department “are no longer subject to 
discipline by the Department for their actions.”62 
In addition to stronger personnel policies, there is a need for 
greater transparency in the Department of Justice’s enforcement 
decisions. This is perhaps most true with respect to preclearance 
submissions under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because, as the 
Texas mid-decade redistricting controversy vividly demonstrated, 
“preclearance decisions can directly affect who gets elected to 
office.”63 In this process, the Department’s role is essentially 
 
 58. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 228–29. 
 59. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1211–1219 (2007); cf. ELAINE KAPLAN & TIM HANNAPEL, 
REVITALIZING THE U.S. OFFICE OF SPECIAL COUNSEL: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE NEXT 
ADMINISTRATION (American Constitution Society Issue Brief 2008), available at 
http://www.acslaw.org/files/Kaplan%20FINAL.pdf. 
 60. See 5 U.S.C. § 1215(a)(3) (2007) (authorizing the Merit Systems Protection Board to 
order disciplinary actions against an employee upon written complaint by the Office of Special 
Counsel, with due process afforded to the employee). 
 61. See id. § 1215(b) (authorizing the President to take “appropriate action” in such cases 
in lieu of the Merit Systems Protection Board process). 
 62. OIG CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION REPORT, supra note 42, at 64; OIG GOODLING REPORT, 
supra note 47, at 138; OIG HONORS PROGRAM REPORT, supra note 46, at 99. 
 63. Rich et al., supra note 9, at 36. 
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adjudicatory and in most cases final. A decision to preclear certifies 
that a voting change satisfies section 5 and is not judicially reviewable, 
although it does not bar litigation to enjoin the change under other 
applicable laws.64 A decision to object does not bar the submitting 
jurisdiction from going to federal court to seek a declaratory 
judgment that the voting change satisfies section 5,65 but this litigation 
option is rarely used. 
Under current law, a decision to object must be accompanied by a 
written explanation.66 However, the Department’s traditional practice 
has been to send “a fairly cursory letter to the submitting jurisdiction, 
which lacks a detailed account of the facts and law that went into the 
determination.”67 Although the staff memorandum informing the 
decision may be obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, the 
Department has no policy of voluntarily disclosing the record of 
decision. This inhibits public understanding of the section 5 process 
and effectively shields the application of section 5 from careful 
scrutiny. Just as the litigation option for preclearance typically results 
in a decision supported by a written record, the administrative 
preclearance process should do the same in order to foster public 
confidence that the law is being applied consistently from case to case. 
Neither confidentiality nor efficiency concerns outweigh the benefits 
of transparency and accountability that would accompany public 
disclosure of the reasons underlying the Department’s decisions to 
object.68 
Moreover, this disclosure requirement should apply not only to 
decisions to object but also to decisions to preclear any voting change 
that presents a substantial question under section 5. Under current 
law, a decision to preclear need not be accompanied by any written 
 
 64. 28 C.F.R. § 51.49 (2008). 
 65. Id. §§ 51.10, 51.44(c). 
 66. Id. § 51.44(a) (requiring that when the Attorney General interposes an objection,  
“[t]he reasons for the decision shall be stated”). 
 67. Kennedy, supra note 7, at 232 n.80. 
 68. See id. at 232. As for efficiency, a decision to object would, in most cases, require 
nothing more than releasing the underlying staff memorandum, whose traditionally high quality 
would tend to build confidence in the decisionmaking process. In the rare case where the 
Department interposes an objection against the recommendation of career staff, the political 
leadership would need to provide a public statement of reasons. As for confidentiality, a public 
statement of reasons for a decision need not disclose the details of the deliberative process. That 
is analogous to what we expect from adjudication in the courts: we do not insist on knowing 
what Supreme Court Justices discuss in conference, but we do expect a public statement of the 
reasons that shape any final decision. 
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statement of reasons,69 and the Texas redistricting case and Georgia 
voter identification case demonstrate the hazards of this practice. In 
principle, there is no reason why public disclosure of reasoning should 
be less important when the Department makes a decision to preclear 
instead of a decision to object; both are highly consequential. In 
practice, however, the sheer volume of submissions resulting in 
preclearance makes it unworkable to require a full statement of 
reasons in every case.70 Thus, Department regulations should limit the 
disclosure requirement to submissions that present a “substantial 
question” under section 5. 
Of course, we can argue over what constitutes a substantial 
question,71 but there is little doubt that the Texas and Georgia 
submissions meet the standard. Those cases suggest that, at a 
minimum, a substantial question exists—and a public statement of 
reasons should be required—when the Department makes a decision 
to preclear in contravention of a staff recommendation to object. 
Beyond that, there may be cases that present sufficiently close 
questions as to warrant public explanation of a decision to preclear, 
and the Attorney General should have final and unreviewable 
authority to make those determinations. The exercise of this authority 
would be checked in two ways. First, in any case where the Attorney 
General finds no substantial question under section 5, the 
preclearance submission and any written record of decision (or lack 
thereof) would still be subject to disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act or a congressional subpoena. Second, although the 
section 2 vote dilution standard is different from the section 5 
retrogression standard, the overlap between the standards means that 
the substantiality of a question under section 5 may occasionally be 
revealed by litigation under section 2, as the 2006 redistricting case 
 
 69. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 51.41, 51.42 (2008). 
 70. See Rich et al., supra note 9, at 35 (“From 2001 to 2005, Section 5 jurisdictions 
submitted over 81,000 voting changes to the Department in a total of almost 25,000 
submissions.”). For this and other reasons, judicial review of preclearance decisions does not 
seem a viable reform. See Nathaniel Persily, The Promises and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights 
Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 215–16 (2007); Nathaniel Persily, Options and Strategies for Renewal of 
Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 223, 232 
(David L. Epstein et al. eds., 2006). 
 71. The standard is not unfamiliar in the context of administrative appeals.  
See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(ii)(IV) (2006) (authorizing discretionary review by the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission of administrative decisions that present 
“[a] substantial question of law, policy or discretion”); 33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3) (2006) (authorizing 
the Benefits Review Board “to hear and determine appeals raising a substantial question of law 
or fact” concerning longshore and harbor workers’ compensation). 
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from Texas demonstrates.72 These checks would help keep the 
Attorney General honest in identifying preclearance submissions that 
present a substantial question under section 5. 
Overall, the disclosure requirement is unlikely to be onerous. In 
recent times, among the thousands of preclearance submissions 
reviewed each year, the Department of Justice has objected to an 
average of ten voting changes per year.73 If the number of submissions 
that present a substantial question and ultimately gain preclearance is 
of a comparable magnitude, then the Department of Justice would 
need to disclose written reasons for only a few dozen section 5 
decisions each year. This limited body of administrative jurisprudence 
would promote transparency and regularity in an important domain 
of decisionmaking. 
Another way to foster accountability is to assign responsibility for 
key decisions to higher levels of political authority within the 
Department of Justice. This may seem counterintuitive in light of the 
earlier discussion on strengthening the role of career staff. But 
consider an analogy to the idea of “presidential administration,” 
which Elena Kagan describes as a mode of governance that “enhances 
transparency, enabling the public to comprehend more accurately the 
sources and nature of bureaucratic power,” and that “establishes an 
electoral link between the public and the bureaucracy, increasing the 
latter’s responsiveness to the former.”74 Of course, moving decisions 
up the Department of Justice hierarchy is not the same as moving 
decisions onto the President’s desk because neither the Attorney 
General nor his political subordinates have the same visibility or 
electoral accountability as the President. Moreover, there are good 
reasons not to subject law enforcement decisions to direct 
presidential control. But because the Attorney General and other 
presidential appointees in the Department are publicly identified with 
the President, decisionmaking by those leaders comes with at least 
some of the “visibility,” “political responsibility,” and “publicizing of 
the bureaucracy” that presidential administration entails.75 
 
 72. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Rich et al., supra note 9, at 35 (noting that the Department of Justice interposed 
objections to forty-eight voting changes in forty submissions from 2001 to 2005, and to fifty-five 
voting changes in thirty-two submissions from 1996 to 2000). The vast majority of voting 
changes precleared by the Department of Justice do not present difficult questions under 
section 5. 
 74. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001). 
 75. Id. at 2332–33. 
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Moving key decisions up the political hierarchy raises two 
concerns, however. First, there is a practical limit to the number of 
decisions that the Attorney General or other top officials can 
meaningfully make. Loading their inboxes with decisions that they 
must personally “own” may simply lead to indecision and delay. 
Second, assigning more decisions to top officials may dilute 
accountability if monitoring mechanisms cannot keep pace. It may be 
politically difficult, for example, to bring the Attorney General before 
a congressional committee more than once or twice a year. The time 
and political bandwidth available in such hearings may be insufficient 
to probe the full range of decisions for which the Attorney General is 
personally responsible. If that is the case, it may be better to assign 
decisions to subordinate officers whom a congressional committee 
could more easily and regularly call to testify. 
The challenge, then, is to establish appropriate filters so that the 
locus of decisionmaking appropriately calibrates the importance of a 
given decision with the desired degree of accountability. The current 
administration should examine whether the current filters are 
working properly. For example, the Attorney General has delegated 
responsibility and authority for section 5 determinations to the 
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, and the authority to 
preclear a voting change (but not to object) has been further 
delegated to the chief of the Voting Section.76 These delegations work 
well in most cases. For the few cases of serious controversy and 
consequence, however, perhaps it makes sense to assign nondelegable 
authority to the Attorney General. One possible filter is to task the 
Attorney General with the final decision in the rare cases where the 
Department ultimately rejects the staff recommendation. As we have 
seen, those are the cases where transparency and accountability are 
most needed. 
Proposals such as these merit discussion in the new administration 
led by President Obama. That discussion must begin with recognition 
that the Department of Justice occupies a special place in the federal 
government. The American people rightly expect the Department, 
more than any other agency, to act with integrity, impartiality, and 
respect for the rule of law. Each administration is entitled to its policy 
priorities, but no administration is entitled to corrupt the process of 
law enforcement for partisan ends. This admonition applies with 
 
 76. 28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2008). 
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special force to the instruments of government charged with 
protecting the historically disenfranchised members of our society. 
II.  PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 
Enforcement of the civil rights laws is the bare minimum of 
executive responsibility. So let me now discuss other activities over 
the past eight years that speak to President Bush’s legacy on civil 
rights. Because presidential leadership provides a rough barometer of 
public attitudes and concerns, focusing on actions personally 
associated with President Bush may help us to interpret the nation’s 
current understandings of civil rights. I will offer some insights in this 
vein by discussing three high-profile events: first, the development of 
the Bush Administration’s position before the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the University of Michigan affirmative action cases; second, the 
passage of the No Child Left Behind Act; and third, the Bush 
Administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina. 
A. Diversity 
In our history, it is rare for the President to speak at length to the 
American public about a Supreme Court case. And it is even more 
rare, perhaps unprecedented, for the President to appear on national 
television for the specific purpose of explaining his legal position in a 
pending case. But that is what President Bush did on Wednesday 
afternoon, January 16, 2003, in a seven-minute address from the 
Roosevelt Room, discussing the University of Michigan affirmative 
action cases.77 
The President’s address was mostly devoted to explaining why he 
thought the undergraduate and law school affirmative action policies 
amounted to racial quotas. “Quota systems,” the President said, “are 
divisive, unfair and impossible to square with the Constitution.” But 
the most significant aspect of the speech, as it turns out, was what the 
President did not say. That became clear the next day when, just 
minutes before the Supreme Court’s midnight deadline, the Solicitor 
General filed the Administration’s amicus briefs in the Michigan 
cases. 
 
 77. Remarks on the Michigan Affirmative Action Case, 39 WKLY. COMP. PRES. DOC. 71 
(Jan. 15, 2003) [hereinafter Remarks], available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ 
news/releases/2003/01/20030115-7.html. 
DO NOT DELETE 6/15/2009 3:38:28 PM 
2009] LESSONS LEARNED: CIVIL RIGHTS 97 
A decade ago, when I graduated from law school, the law did not 
bode well for affirmative action in higher education. In 1995, the 
Supreme Court had consolidated two decades of doctrinal moves 
toward colorblindness into a toughly worded strict scrutiny standard.78 
In 1996, California passed a state constitutional ban on affirmative 
action in public education, employment, and contracting,79 and the 
Fifth Circuit in Hopwood v. Texas invalidated the use of affirmative 
action by the University of Texas Law School, dismissing Justice 
Powell’s opinion in the Bakke case as the ruminations of a single 
Justice.80 Moreover, the swing vote on the Supreme Court, Justice 
O’Connor, had played a leading role in casting constitutional doubt 
on affirmative action. In 1989, she hinted that affirmative action must 
be “strictly reserved for remedial settings,”81 and in 1990, she said that 
“[m]odern equal protection doctrine has recognized only one 
[compelling] interest [for using race]: remedying the effects of racial 
discrimination.”82 When Barbara Grutter and Jennifer Gratz sued the 
University of Michigan in 1997, there was every reason to think that 
the Supreme Court was ready to close the door on using race to 
achieve an educationally diverse student body. 
Ending affirmative action has long been one of the goals of the 
conservative legal movement, and President Bush appointed two 
Justices to the Supreme Court who are highly skeptical of  
race-conscious government action.83 It is notable, then, that neither 
President Bush’s speech nor the Administration’s brief in the 
Michigan cases urged the Court to reject the diversity rationale and 
put the final nail in the coffin. Instead, the Administration attacked 
the Michigan policies under the constitutional narrow tailoring 
requirement while affirming diversity in higher education as a 
compelling interest. “I strongly support diversity of all kinds, including 
racial diversity in higher education,” President Bush said in his 
 
 78. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). 
 79. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31. 
 80. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996) (discussing Regents of Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)). 
 81. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
 82. Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 83. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2768 
(2007) (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Scalia, Thomas & Alito, JJ.) (“The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”);  
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, joined by Alito, J.) 
(“It is a sordid business, this divvying us up by race.”). 
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speech. “America is a diverse country, racially, economically, and 
ethnically. And our institutions of higher education should reflect our 
diversity. A college education should teach respect and understanding 
and goodwill. And these values are strengthened when students live 
and learn with people from many backgrounds.”84 
By declining to call for either a categorical prohibition on the use 
of race or a reconsideration of Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke, 
President Bush disappointed conservatives who have long insisted 
that anything short of a blanket rule will invite university officials to 
engage in more and more creative forms of affirmative action. And it 
must have been particularly galling to those conservatives that the 
Supreme Court, in upholding educational diversity as a compelling 
interest, directly quoted the Administration’s brief: “The United 
States, as amicus curiae, affirms that ‘[e]nsuring that public institutions 
are open and available to all segments of American society, including 
people of all races and ethnicities, represents a paramount 
government objective.’ And, ‘[n]owhere is the importance of such 
openness more acute than in the context of higher education.’”85 
Critics on the left might say that President Bush was trying to 
have it both ways: support diversity, but oppose any legal standard 
that actually advances it. Another interpretation is that the President 
opted for a narrow argument because he thought it was the most 
likely approach to convince Justice O’Connor to invalidate the 
Michigan policies.86 Perhaps these explanations are plausible. At the 
same time, however, there seems to be more to the story. 
Does President Bush believe in diversity? It is hard to answer 
such a question, but we can look for clues in at least one set of 
important decisions: his Cabinet appointments.87 Over eight years, 
President Bush made forty-seven Cabinet-level appointments: seven 
were women, and ten were racial or ethnic minorities. By comparison, 
President Clinton made forty-three appointments: eight were women, 
and fourteen were racial or ethnic minorities. President Bush’s 
Cabinet was more diverse than his father’s, and it was far more 
 
 84. Remarks, supra note 77. 
 85. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331–32 (2003) (quoting Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241)). 
 86. Linda Greenhouse, Bush and Affirmative Action: Muted Call in Race Case, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 17, 2003, at A1. 
 87. See Susan Page, Bush Is Opening Doors with a Diverse Cabinet, USA TODAY,  
Dec. 10, 2004, at 17A. 
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diverse than the nearly all-white, all-male Cabinet appointed by 
President Ronald Reagan. Moreover, President Bush appointed racial 
minorities to the most influential Cabinet-level posts: Colin Powell 
and Condoleezza Rice as Secretary of State and Alberto Gonzalez as 
Attorney General. All three individuals counseled President Bush 
against a broad-gauged attack on affirmative action in the Michigan 
cases, even as Solicitor General Ted Olson and other conservative 
Administration lawyers apparently urged a stronger position against 
using race to achieve diversity.88 
The briefs that Olson ultimately filed reflect the influence of 
moderation and compromise to the point of incoherence. In the law 
school case, the Administration’s brief argued that the “use of  
race-based admissions criteria is not justified in light of the ample 
race-neutral alternatives” and extensively discussed the “percentage 
plans” implemented by Texas, Florida, and California to achieve 
undergraduate diversity.89 The obvious problem, as the Supreme 
Court noted, is that “[t]he United States does not . . . explain how such 
plans could work for graduate and professional schools.”90 
One might say that Cabinet appointments as well as President 
Bush’s rhetorical endorsement of diversity are largely symbolic. But 
symbolic of what? Surely it is relevant and encouraging that the Bush 
Administration continued, across party lines, a practice of elevating 
qualified women and minorities to the highest ranks of government. 
One might say that President Bush’s position reflects a political 
calculation concerning the electoral fortunes of the Republican Party. 
So what if it does? If that means we have reached a point in our 
national politics where both parties seek the votes of minority 
citizens, then good for us. If it means the business community and the 
military, both of which filed briefs in support of Michigan’s 
 
 88. See Mike Allen, Rice: Race Can Be Factor in College Admissions, WASH. POST,  
Jan. 18, 2003, at A1 (reporting Rice’s statement that she opposed the Michigan policies but that 
“‘it is appropriate to use race as one factor among others in achieving a diverse student body,’” 
and quoting Powell as supporting the Michigan policies); Mike Allen & Charles Lane, Rice 
Helped Shape Bush Decision on Admissions, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2003, at A1 (reporting that 
Olson and other conservative lawyers urged President Bush to adopt a broader argument 
against affirmative action); Amy Goldstein & Dana Milbank, Bush Joins Admissions Case Fight; 
U-Mich. Use of Race Is Called ‘Divisive,’ WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 2003, at A1 (reporting that 
Gonzales “argued for restraint to avoid offending the fast-growing Hispanic population”). 
 89. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, 14–18, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). 
 90. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340. 
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affirmative action policies,91 have influenced how conservatives as 
well as liberals see the value of diversity, then good for us. And if it 
means the American people, red or blue, no longer consider it unusual 
and have even come to expect qualified women and minorities to 
serve at the highest levels of government, then good for us. 
President Bush’s handling of the Michigan cases provides a lens 
for interpreting our nation’s ongoing struggle with race. That struggle 
has always engaged both symbol and substance. And today, having 
inaugurated the nation’s first African-American president, it is clear 
that symbols matter. 
B. No Child Left Behind 
But what, then, of the substance? Let us put to one side the 
everyday work of the Department of Justice, which the President 
supervises only from a distance. If one were to ask President Bush to 
identify the signature civil rights initiative of his Administration, my 
guess is that he would say the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, a 
law he personally championed and helped craft based on his 
experience as Governor of Texas. 
Enacted by bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate, NCLB 
is rightly labeled a civil rights statute for three reasons. First, NCLB 
marks the first time in our history that narrowing the achievement 
gap has been codified as a national priority.92 Second, NCLB requires 
schools and districts to disaggregate student achievement data by race 
for purposes of public reporting and accountability.93 The concept of 
unmasking disparities that broad averages tend to hide is what gives 
the No Child Left Behind law its name. Third, the obligation of states, 
districts, and schools to close achievement gaps does not depend on 
 
 91. Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241); Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241). The influential 
amicus brief filed by retired military officers was instigated by former President Gerald Ford, a 
strong supporter of affirmative action in higher education. See Jeffrey Toobin, Gerald Ford’s 
Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A19; Gerald R. Ford, Inclusive America, 
Under Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, at A15. 
 92. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6301(3) (2006) (identifying “[c]losing the achievement gap 
between high and low-performing children, especially the achievement gaps between minority 
and nonminority students, and between disadvantaged children and their more advantaged 
peers” as a means of “ensur[ing] that all children have a fair, equal, and significant opportunity 
to obtain a high-quality education”). 
 93. See id. § 6311(b)(2)(C)(v)(II) (requiring disaggregation of data regarding “students 
from major racial and ethnic groups,” among other groups). 
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any finding of discriminatory intent or state action. Where a disparity 
in achievement exists, there is official responsibility to remedy it.94 
These developments are noteworthy in light of the general fatigue 
with race in legal doctrine and our public culture. 
Criticisms of NCLB are as vehement as they are numerous: the 
law is underfunded; it has led states to lower academic standards; it 
has created a two-tiered curriculum of rich academic offerings for 
high-achieving kids and insipid test preparation for low-achieving 
kids; it gives schools an incentive to push out low performers; it does 
not ensure that all children have effective teachers; it is overly 
punitive and does not reward success; and the list goes on. Many of 
these criticisms have some validity, but they are not my focus here. 
NCLB may soon undergo a makeover that responds to what is known 
about how schools actually improve and that focuses attention not 
only on achievement gaps but also on the opportunity gaps that 
underlie them. 
Whatever else might be said about NCLB, however, the law has 
made a positive contribution to public education by requiring 
disaggregation of data and directing urgent attention to raising the 
achievement of disadvantaged children. The transparency brought 
about by NCLB has won praise from policymakers, researchers, and 
advocates across the political spectrum, and it will likely endure in the 
policy approach of any statutory reauthorization. 
I fully support this aspect of NCLB and see no reason to change it. 
But I would like to pose a question: What kinds of schools and school 
districts was NCLB designed for? Or, to put it another way, what 
actionable information does NCLB make available that wasn’t 
available before? Racial disaggregation of achievement data is a 
powerful tool for transparency and accountability, but it assumes that 
we are dealing with schools that enroll multiple racial groups. If a 
school enrolls a white majority and a black or Hispanic minority, 
NCLB ensures that the average performance school-wide does not 
mask disparities between groups. However, if a school has 70%, 80%, 
or 90% black or Hispanic enrollment, there is no need to disaggregate 
data by race in order to learn how minority students are doing. In 
highly segregated schools, school-wide averages reflect the 
 
 94. See id. § 6316 (requiring improvement for any school failing to make adequate yearly 
progress under § 6311(b)(2), which defines such progress without regard to discriminatory 
intent or state action). 
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performance of the segregated group. Further, although NCLB 
requires data disaggregation at the district level in addition to the 
school level, most highly segregated schools in America are located in 
highly segregated school districts.95 Indeed, this fact also undermines 
the transfer option under NCLB that entitles children in a  
low-performing school to switch to a better school in the same 
district.96 When low-performing schools are located in low-performing 
districts, the transfer option is illusory. 
The unfortunate fact is that most racial minorities who live in 
concentrated poverty attend segregated schools in segregated districts 
that do not provide high-quality educational opportunities. Consider 
the public schools of Detroit (90% black), Los Angeles (73% Latino), 
Baltimore (89% black), Santa Ana (92% Latino), Memphis (86% 
black), or El Paso (81% Latino).97 In those districts, what do we know 
under NCLB that we did not know before? If “sunshine and shame” 
are NCLB’s principal contributions to the education landscape, then 
NCLB has added little to the cause of improving racially isolated, 
high-poverty schools and school districts. For we already knew, long 
before NCLB, that those schools and districts are struggling and often 
lack the essential building blocks for change. NCLB has done little to 
provide those building blocks, and as a result, we continue to consign 
our most disadvantaged students to a separate and unequal education 
in our most disadvantaged schools. 
My point is not that NCLB is bad policy. On balance, I think it is a 
step forward in the evolution of a federal role dedicated to equalizing 
educational opportunity. My point is that the policy levers in NCLB, 
such as disaggregation of school and district data and school choice 
within districts, seem mismatched to the nature and severity of the 
challenges. Unequal opportunity is rooted in complex policy choices 
that spatially isolate children racially and socioeconomically, in school 
finance systems that do not adequately provide for the needs of 
disadvantaged children, in teacher policies that do not reward 
performance and too often assign the most inexperienced teachers to 
 
 95. See Sean F. Reardon et al., The Changing Structure of School Segregation: Measurement 
and Evidence of Multiracial Metropolitan-Area School Segregation, 1989–1995,  
37 DEMOGRAPHY 351, 358 (2000) (studying 217 metropolitan areas and finding that two-thirds 
of school segregation occurs across district lines). 
 96. 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (2006). 
 97. ANTHONY GAROFANO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 100 
LARGEST PUBLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2005–06, at A-20 to -21 tbl.A-9 (2008). 
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the most challenging schools, and in structures of education 
governance that tend to preserve the status quo instead of helping the 
least advantaged. These are among the most important civil rights 
issues we face today, and the lesson learned from NCLB is that we 
still have not developed an effective national policy agenda to ensure 
equal educational opportunity for minority children who live in 
concentrated poverty. 
C. Katrina 
Finally, if there was ever an opportunity in recent times to 
galvanize a national consensus for a new civil rights agenda, it was in 
the days and weeks after August 29, 2005, when Hurricane Katrina 
killed over 1,500 people and displaced 700,000 others along the Gulf 
Coast.98 Next to the tragedy of September 11, 2001, Katrina is the 
single most consequential catastrophic event that occurred during the 
Bush presidency. The social challenges that affirmative action and 
NCLB tend to obscure are precisely the ones that Katrina laid bare. 
Natural disasters are sometimes said to be great equalizers of 
society. As Katrina showed, nothing could be further from the truth. A 
good deal of attention has focused on the incompetent government 
response to the hurricane and the racially disparate impact of the 
destruction and ensuing misery.99 But far less attention has been paid 
to why the black citizens of New Orleans were so disproportionately 
harmed by Katrina. As a junior Senator from Illinois said at the time, 
“[T]he people of New Orleans weren’t just abandoned during the 
hurricane. They were abandoned long ago.”100 
The racial history of New Orleans is, in many ways, paradigmatic 
of the development of many American cities, involving a virulent 
combination of school segregation, housing segregation, migration of 
 
 98. THOMAS GABE ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, HURRICANE KATRINA: 
SOCIAL-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF IMPACTED AREAS 7 (2005) (reporting that 
“more than 700,000 people were most acutely impacted by Hurricane Katrina, having lived in 
neighborhoods that either experienced flooding or significant structural damage”);  
Michelle Hunter, Deaths of Evacuees Push Toll to 1,577; Out-of-State Victims Mostly Elderly, 
Infirm, TIMES-PICAYUNE (LA.), May 19, 2006, at 1. 
 99. See, e.g., RICHARD CAMPANELLA, GEOGRAPHIES OF NEW ORLEANS: URBAN 
FABRICS BEFORE THE STORM 398–401 (2006); GABE ET AL., supra note 98, at 14–17;  
Todd S. Purdum, Across U.S., Outrage at Response, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2005, at A1;  
WHEN THE LEVEES BROKE: A REQUIEM IN FOUR ACTS (Home Box Office 2006). 
 100. Jonathan Alter, The Other America, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 19, 2005, at 42 (quoting Sen. 
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people and jobs away from minority neighborhoods, inadequate 
public transportation, and selective indifference to mitigating 
environmental hazards.101 This has long been a foolproof recipe for 
racial segregation and concentrated poverty, and Katrina revealed 
that we lack a coherent social policy to address the intersection of 
race and poverty. 
A few days after the levees broke, a reporter called me to ask 
whether the government’s response to Katrina raised any 
constitutional questions. I proceeded to explain that our courts 
generally do not recognize positive rights to government assistance 
and that the disparities revealed by Katrina were unlikely to be 
actionable given the difficulties of proving intentional discrimination. 
Upon reflection, however, I came to feel that my lawyerly answer did 
not respond to the true angle of her question, which seemed 
motivated by the common-sense observation that something has gone 
terribly wrong in our constitutional democracy when the cleavages of 
race and class play out with such severe consequences. 
To my mind, the tragedy of Katrina has four dimensions: first, the 
devastation caused by the hurricane itself; second, the indignity and 
suffering caused by the government response; third, the racial and 
economic disparities in suffering caused by decades of public 
inattention to, and facilitation of, the underlying conditions that poor 
African-Americans face; and fourth, the enormous missed 
opportunity for presidential leadership to renew America’s 
commitment to equality. This last point deserves emphasis, for the 
nation is seldom forced to confront its own shortcomings so 
prominently and pointedly. The images of Katrina left us with 
nowhere to hide; we could not shift our gaze elsewhere. In that brief 
 
 101. See CAMPANELLA, supra note 99, at 297–314 (discussing the geography of the African-
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moment of rapt attention and genuine empathy, there was an 
opportunity to unite the nation behind a new agenda to attack 
poverty and racial inequality.102 There was a window for bold 
initiatives and a departure from politics as usual. But the moment 
passed, and regrettably, so did the opportunity. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Today, when it comes to galvanizing the American people in 
support of a national imperative, no institution of government rivals 
the modern presidency. This was not the intent of our Constitution’s 
Framers, but it is a fact of the nation we have become.103 A President 
can speak directly to the people with one voice. A President can set 
the agenda and stay the course for a sustained period of time. A 
President can do the hard work of policy implementation necessary to 
bring about change. A President can articulate a vision responsive to 
the nation in its entirety, not just to one of its parts. And a President 
can translate the Constitution into the language of justice without fear 
of overstepping his authority. In short, a President can lead—and 
because he can lead, he must. 
 
 
 102. Cf. ALAN BERUBE & BRUCE KATZ, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, KATRINA’S WINDOW: 
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 103. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
